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Add a new diagram covering the authentication mechanism: a session-based /SASLogon/login + /SASLogon/authorize handshake that mints a short-lived auth code, exchanged at /SASjsApi/auth/token for a revocable JWT pair, with optional LDAP-backed credential verification. Add WHY comments (not present before) at the handful of spots in the auth code whose behaviour isn't obvious from reading them in isolation: why /auth/token can return an existing token pair instead of rotating it, why the auth-code exchange never checks a client's clientSecret, how verifyTokenInDB turns self-verifying JWTs into revocable ones, why two /SASjsApi/user routes stay reachable in desktop mode, why the static authorized-route list exists on top of plain authentication, and why /SASjsApi/client's real protection lives at its router mount point in routes/api/index.ts rather than in client.ts itself.
13 KiB
13 KiB
Authentication flow
How a client (browser SPA or CLI/SDK) turns a username/password into an
authenticated SASjsApi request, and how that request is subsequently
authorized. The mechanism is a self-hosted session-then-authorization-code
flow, optionally backed by LDAP for credential verification.
sequenceDiagram
participant Browser as Client<br/>(browser SPA, or CLI/SDK<br/>simulating one with a cookie jar)
participant Web as Web routes + controller<br/>(routes/web/web.ts,<br/>controllers/web.ts)
participant Mid as authenticateAccessToken<br/>(middlewares/authenticateToken.ts)
participant Authz as authorize<br/>(middlewares/authorize.ts)
participant AuthCtrl as Auth routes + controller<br/>(routes/api/auth.ts,<br/>controllers/auth.ts)
participant Sess as Session store<br/>(MongoDB via connect-mongo)
participant DB as MongoDB<br/>(User / Client / Permission)
participant LDAP as LDAP server<br/>(optional, AUTH_PROVIDERS=ldap)
participant API as Any SASjsApi route
Note over Browser,Web: STEP 0 - load the app, get a CSRF token
Browser->>Web: GET /
Web-->>Browser: index.html with an inline script that sets<br/>document.cookie = XSRF-TOKEN=...<br/>(routes/web/web.ts:14-32, csrfProtection.ts:7)
Note over Browser,LDAP: STEP 1 - username/password login, establishes a session
Browser->>Web: POST /SASLogon/login { username, password }
Web->>Web: desktopRestrict - 403 if MODE=desktop (desktop.ts:19-28)
Web->>Web: bruteForceProtection + RateLimiter.consume(ip, username)<br/>(routes/web/web.ts:37, controllers/web.ts:106-113)
Web->>DB: User.findOne({ username }) (controllers/web.ts:86)
alt AUTH_PROVIDERS=ldap and user.authProvider=ldap
Web->>LDAP: LDAPClient.verifyUser(username, password) -<br/>looks up the user's DN, then binds as them<br/>(controllers/web.ts:95-98, utils/ldapClient.ts)
LDAP-->>Web: bind succeeds or rejects
else local user (default)
Web->>Web: user.comparePassword(password) - bcrypt<br/>compare against the stored hash (controllers/web.ts:100)
end
Web->>Sess: req.session.loggedIn = true<br/>req.session.user = { userId, clientId: "web_app",<br/>username, isAdmin, autoExec, ... } (controllers/web.ts:122-132)
Sess-->>Browser: Set-Cookie: connect.sid=...<br/>(httpOnly, 24h maxAge, connect-mongo backed,<br/>app-modules/configureExpressSession.ts:30-46)
Web-->>Browser: 200 { loggedIn: true, user: {...} }<br/>(controllers/web.ts:134-143) - note: no token yet
Note over Browser,DB: STEP 2 - exchange the session for a short-lived auth code
Browser->>Web: POST /SASLogon/authorize { clientId }<br/>Cookie: connect.sid=...<br/>X-XSRF-TOKEN: <value read from the XSRF-TOKEN cookie>
Web->>Mid: authenticateAccessToken (routes/web/web.ts:58)
Mid->>Mid: req.session.loggedIn is true, so this request<br/>is validated via the session branch, not a JWT<br/>(authenticateToken.ts:32-44)
Mid->>DB: fetchLatestAutoExec(req.session.user) - re-reads<br/>the User row so isActive/isAdmin/autoExec are current,<br/>not whatever was cached at login time (authenticateToken.ts:34,<br/>utils/verifyTokenInDB.ts:4-21)
Mid->>Mid: csrfProtection - verify the submitted token<br/>against the server-held secret (authenticateToken.ts:39,<br/>csrfProtection.ts:9-32)
Mid-->>Web: next()
Web->>DB: Client.findOne({ clientId }) (controllers/web.ts:153)
Web->>Web: generateAuthCode({ clientId, userId }) - a JWT<br/>signed with AUTH_CODE_SECRET, 30s expiry<br/>(utils/generateAuthCode.ts:4-7)
Web->>Web: AuthController.saveCode(userId, clientId, code) -<br/>kept in an in-memory map on the Node process,<br/>not persisted to DB (controllers/auth.ts:30-36)
Web-->>Browser: 200 { code }
Note over Browser,DB: STEP 3 - exchange the auth code for access/refresh tokens
Browser->>AuthCtrl: POST /SASjsApi/auth/token { clientId, code }
AuthCtrl->>AuthCtrl: verifyAuthCode() - jwt.verify(code, AUTH_CODE_SECRET),<br/>then check the payload's clientId matches (controllers/auth.ts:229-248)
AuthCtrl->>AuthCtrl: code must equal AuthController.authCodes[userId][clientId],<br/>then it is deleted - single use (controllers/auth.ts:92-101)
AuthCtrl->>DB: Client.findOne({ clientId }) - reads<br/>accessTokenExpiration/refreshTokenExpiration (controllers/auth.ts:112-113)
Note right of AuthCtrl: no clientSecret check happens here -<br/>the short-lived, single-use auth code from<br/>step 2 is the actual credential
AuthCtrl->>AuthCtrl: generateAccessToken() / generateRefreshToken() -<br/>JWTs signed with ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET / REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET<br/>(utils/generateAccessToken.ts, utils/generateRefreshToken.ts)
AuthCtrl->>DB: saveTokensInDB() - persists both tokens on<br/>the User document's tokens array, keyed by clientId<br/>(utils/saveTokensInDB.ts, controllers/auth.ts:124)
AuthCtrl-->>Browser: 200 { accessToken, refreshToken }
Note over Browser,API: STEP 4 - authenticated API request (this is also how<br/>CLI/SDK clients authenticate on every call after<br/>obtaining a token once via steps 0-3)
Browser->>API: any /SASjsApi/... request<br/>Authorization: Bearer <accessToken>
API->>Mid: authenticateAccessToken - no session cookie this<br/>time, so it falls through to JWT verification (authenticateToken.ts:46-52)
Mid->>Mid: jwt.verify(token, ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET) (authenticateToken.ts:97)
Mid->>DB: verifyTokenInDB(userId, clientId, token, "accessToken") -<br/>token must still equal the one on file for this user+client,<br/>not just be a validly-signed JWT (authenticateToken.ts:99-104,<br/>utils/verifyTokenInDB.ts:23-49)
alt token missing, invalid, or no longer matches DB (e.g. after logout)
Mid->>DB: isPublicRoute(req)? - is there a Permission<br/>granting the built-in Public group access to this path?<br/>(utils/isPublicRoute.ts:8-22)
Mid-->>API: req.user = publicUser and continue,<br/>or 401 Unauthorized if not public (authenticateToken.ts:116-121)
else token valid and user.isActive
Mid->>Mid: req.user = user, req.accessToken = token (authenticateToken.ts:107-110)
opt request path is in getAuthorizedRoutes()<br/>(utils/getAuthorizedRoutes.ts:16-20)
Mid->>Authz: authorize middleware (authenticateToken.ts:26-27)
Authz->>DB: Permission lookups, first grant wins:<br/>admin bypass, public bypass, then user-specific<br/>route permission, user top-level permission,<br/>each of the user's groups at route level,<br/>each of the user's groups at top level (authorize.ts:10-87)
Authz-->>API: next(), or 401 if nothing grants access
end
end
API-->>Browser: 200 + response
Note over Browser,DB: Token refresh, once the access token nears/hits expiry
Browser->>AuthCtrl: POST /SASjsApi/auth/refresh<br/>Authorization: Bearer <refreshToken>
AuthCtrl->>Mid: authenticateRefreshToken - same JWT + DB<br/>cross-check as step 4, against REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET<br/>and the stored refreshToken (authenticateToken.ts:55-67)
AuthCtrl->>AuthCtrl: generateAccessToken() / generateRefreshToken() again<br/>(controllers/auth.ts:133-140)
AuthCtrl->>DB: saveTokensInDB() - overwrites the stored pair,<br/>the previous refreshToken stops working (controllers/auth.ts:142-147)
AuthCtrl-->>Browser: 200 { accessToken, refreshToken }
Note over Browser,Sess: Logout
Browser->>AuthCtrl: DELETE /SASjsApi/auth/logout (bearer clients)
AuthCtrl->>DB: removeTokensInDB() - clears this clientId's<br/>entry from User.tokens (utils/removeTokensInDB.ts, controllers/auth.ts:152-153)
AuthCtrl-->>Browser: 204
Browser->>Web: GET /SASLogon/logout (session/browser clients)
Web->>Sess: req.session.destroy() (controllers/web.ts:63-67)
Web-->>Browser: 200 OK! - the session document is deleted<br/>server-side and connect.sid is no longer valid
Two credentials, not one
Unlike a typical single-token OAuth setup, this system layers two distinct credential checks:
- The session cookie (
connect.sid) - proves "this browser already logged in with a password (or LDAP bind)". Only used for the/SASLogon/*routes. Stored server-side in MongoDB viaconnect-mongo(app-modules/configureExpressSession.ts), so it can't be forged without theSESSION_SECRET, and expires after 24 hours regardless of activity. - The bearer JWT (
accessToken/refreshToken) - proves "this caller was issued a token by exchanging a valid auth code". Used for everySASjsApiroute. Despite being a self-verifying JWT, it is also cross-checked against a copy stored on theUserdocument (utils/verifyTokenInDB.ts:23-49) - this is what makes server-side revocation possible (logout, or issuing a new token pair via refresh, immediately invalidates the old token even though its JWT signature is still technically valid until expiry).
A CLI/SDK client (e.g. @sasjs/adapter) does not have a real browser, so it
plays the role of "Browser" in the diagram above by keeping its own cookie
jar for steps 0-2, then switches to bearer-token auth for everything after -
it does not need a session for any request beyond obtaining the initial
token pair.
Branches and edge cases
- Desktop mode (
MODE=desktop):authenticateAccessTokenshort-circuits to a fixed, always-admindesktopUserbefore any session/token logic runs (authenticateToken.ts:20-24,middlewares/desktop.ts:30-38) - no password, session, or CSRF check ever happens.desktopRestrictadditionally blocks all three/SASLogon/*routes outright in this mode (middlewares/desktop.ts:19-28), since there is no concept of logging in or out of a single-user desktop install. - Public routes: if token/session auth fails outright, the request is
not necessarily rejected -
isPublicRoute()checks whether an admin has granted the built-in Public group access to that specific path (utils/isPublicRoute.ts). If so, the request proceeds as the fixedpublicUser(userId: 0,isAdmin: false) instead of getting a 401. - LDAP: when
AUTH_PROVIDERS=ldap, only users whoseUser.authProviderisldaptake the LDAP bind path at login; this flag is set when an admin runsPOST /SASjsApi/authConfig/synchroniseWithLDAP(controllers/authConfig.ts), which provisions localUser/Groupdocuments from the LDAP directory. Users created directly in this app (authProviderunset) always use the local bcrypt path, even if LDAP is configured. Clientregistration (model/Client.ts) is a separate, lightweight concept from end-user accounts: aclientId/clientSecretpair with configurable access/refresh token lifetimes, used only to look up token expirations during the exchange in step 3 -clientSecretis stored but never actually checked in the token exchange (see the note in the diagram). BothPOSTandGET /SASjsApi/client(routes/api/client.ts) require an authenticated admin - not via anything in that file, but viaauthenticateAccessToken/verifyAdminapplied to the whole/clientprefix at the mount point inroutes/api/index.ts:28-34, which runs before any request reachesclientRouter's own handlers.authorizemiddleware permission model (middlewares/authorize.ts): admins and requests to already-public routes always pass. Otherwise, the first matchingPermissionwins, checked in this order: the specific user on the exact route, the specific user on the route's top-level prefix (/SASjsApior/AppStream), then each of the user's groups on the exact route, then each of the user's groups on the top-level prefix. This middleware only runs at all for routes listed ingetAuthorizedRoutes()(utils/getAuthorizedRoutes.ts:5-20) - a fixed set of sensitive routes (code/STP execution, drive file operations) plus/SASjsApi,/AppStream, and any configured streaming app sub-routes. Routes outside that list only require authentication, not a granted permission.
Key source files
api/src/routes/web/web.ts,api/src/controllers/web.ts-/SASLogon/login,/SASLogon/authorize,/SASLogon/logout; the browser-facing, session-based half of the flow.api/src/routes/api/auth.ts,api/src/controllers/auth.ts-/SASjsApi/auth/token,/refresh,/logout,/updatePassword; the token-based half used by every API caller.api/src/middlewares/authenticateToken.ts-authenticateAccessToken/authenticateRefreshToken, the single entry point that decides between desktop bypass, session validation, and JWT validation.api/src/middlewares/authorize.ts- permission checks layered on top of authentication, for routes ingetAuthorizedRoutes().api/src/middlewares/csrfProtection.ts- CSRF token generation/verification for session-authenticated (cookie-based) requests.api/src/utils/verifyTokenInDB.ts-verifyTokenInDB(DB-backed revocation check) andfetchLatestAutoExec(refreshes session-cached user fields).api/src/utils/isPublicRoute.ts,api/src/utils/getAuthorizedRoutes.ts- the Public-group fallback and the authorization-required route list.api/src/app-modules/configureExpressSession.ts- session cookie/store configuration (MongoDB viaconnect-mongo).api/src/model/User.ts,api/src/model/Client.ts,api/src/model/Permission.ts,api/src/model/Group.ts- the underlying data model.